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Abstract
Purpose: We introduce non-Ricardian (”hand-to-mouth”) myopic agents into an other-
wise standard real-business-cycle (RBC) setup augmented with a detailed government
sector.We investigate the quantitative importance of the presence of non-optimizing
households for cyclical fluctuations in Bulgaria.
Design Methodology/approach: We calibrate the RBC model to Bulgarian data for
the period following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999-2018).
Findings: We find that the inclusion of such non-Ricardian households improves model
performance along several dimensions and generally provides a better match vis-a-vis
data, as compared to the standard model populated with Ricardian agents only.
Originality/value: This is a novel finding in the macroeconomic studies on Bulgaria
using modern quantitative methods.
Keywords: business cycles, non-Ricardian households, hand-to-mouth, myopic be-
havior, Bulgaria
JEL Classification Codes: E24, E32
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1 Introduction and Motivation
One of the postulates of the real-business-cycle (RBC) theory is that household are rational-,
forward-looking individuals who make dynamically optimal decisions in the face of uncer-
tainty. More specifically, they make consumption and leisure decisions based on an intertem-
poral criterion, and those allocations are not necessarily following their period income. By
choosing their consumption path in an optimal manner, households also choose optimally
how to split their current income between consumption and saving. In the standard RBC
model, saving takes place in the form of investment in capital accumulation, and the pos-
session of more physical capital generates a higher income in the future. In other words,
physical capital is the vehicle in the model that allows households to transfer wealth over
time.1
An important implicit assumption made in the standard model is that capital markets are
efficient, and households can freely save or borrow to smooth their consumption. Often
such households are referred to as ”Ricardian” as for them the so called ”Ricardian equiv-
alence” holds.2 Alternatively, a one-time transfer is unlikely to significantly change (if at
all) their current consumption. However, a major result documented in the empirical lit-
erature is the so called ”excess sensitivity” of consumption relative to current income. In
other words, current consumption seems to respond too much to current income. This comes
in stark contrast with the permanent-income/life-cycle hypothesis, which argues that cur-
rent consumption should follow permanent/life-time income and ignore changes in transitory
(current) income, while trying to smooth consumption along their lifespan. These observed
deviations from intertemporal optimization, which the standard RBC model is founded in,
are puzzling. Still, those shortcoming of the benchmark setup can be rationalized with the
incorporation of liquidity constraints, whose existence is a matter of fact.
1In the general case physical capital is also assumed to be ”reversible,” or that investment can be negative,
i.e. physical capital can be transformed into a consumption good, and eaten. Those are so-called ”putty-
putty” economies. There are ”putty-clay” economies where capital is ”irreversible”: once invested, it cannot
be transformed back into consumption.
2This means that households will foresee that a tax cut today translates into a tax increase in the future.
If not, the government budget constraint will be violated. The amount of the tax cut will be then saved and
invested to meet the increased household’s tax liability in the future.
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We take the issues above seriously, and address them within a general-equilibrium con-
text. We introduce non-Ricardian (”hand-to-mouth”) myopic agents, whose consumption
will follow their current income due to their inability to borrow and smooth consumption
intertemporally. Those non-optimizing agents will populate the model economy and will
co-habit with the forward-looking (Ricardian) agents, who will base their decision on the
discounted future flow of income. Only Ricardian households are allowed to save and invest
in physical capital, which is not possible for the non-Ricardian individuals, as the latter
might be poor, subject to liquidity constraints, or other forms of financial imperfections,
which excludes them from participating in the capital markets. Such issues are typical in
developing countries. Those issues might have significant effects for fiscal policy issues, as
shown in Mankiw (2000), especially in economies where the proportion of non-Ricardian
households is sufficiently large. In this paper we choose Bulgaria as a testing case, as Bul-
garia, despite being a member state of the European Union (EU), is still the poorest member
of the union (NSI 2019).3
We then include both types of households into an otherwise standard RBC setup augmented
with a detailed government sector.4 We calibrate the model to Bulgarian data for the period
following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999-2018). We investigate
the quantitative importance of the presence of non-optimizing households for cyclical fluctu-
ations in Bulgaria. We find that the inclusion of such non-optimizing households improves
model performance along several dimensions and provide a better match vis-a-vis data, as
compared to the standard model with Ricardian agents only. Therefore, capital markets
imperfections, or restricted access to credit for some of the households in the population
may have important repercussions for fiscal policy issues and income inequality, and thus
the inclusion of non-Ricardian agents is a must when investigating such questions in general-
3Empirical studies on other countries, performed using both micro- and macroeconomic data, have also
shown that a significant share of the population is subject to borrowing constraints, e.g. Campbell and
Mankiw (1989), Deaton (1992), Wolff (1998), Souleses (1999), and Johnson et al. (2006), among many
others.
4Other studies that utilize Ricardina and non-Ricardian housholds, mostly to study fiscal policy issues,
are Coenen and Straub (2005), Gali et al. (2007), Iwata (2009), among many others.
3
Page 3 of 22 Journal of Economics and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Econom
ics and Developm
ent
equilibrium setups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model framework and
describes the decentralized competitive equilibrium system, Section 3 discusses the calibra-
tion procedure, and Section 4 presents the steady-state model solution. Sections 5 proceeds
with the out-of-steady-state dynamics of model variables, and compared the simulated second
moments of theoretical variables against their empirical counterparts. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Model Description
There is an ω mass of forward-looking (Ricardian) households, and a 1 − ω mass of hand-
to-mouth (non-Ricardian) households. Both types of households derive utility out of con-
sumption and leisure, but only the Ricardian type can save and invest in capital. The time
available to households can be spent in productive use or as leisure. The government taxes
consumption spending, levies a common proportional (”flat”) tax on income, in order to fi-
nance wasteful purchases of government consumption goods, and government transfers. On
the production side, there is a representative firm, which hires labor and capital to produce
a homogenous final good, which could be used for consumption, investment, or government
purchases.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Ricardian Households
There is an ω mass (0 < ω < 1) of forward-looking (Ricardian) households, denoted by i,
who maximize their expected utility function
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln cit + γ ln(1− hit)
}
(2.1)
where E0 denotes household i’s expectations as of period 0, c
i
t denotes household i’s private
consumption in period t, hit are hours worked in period t, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor,
4
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0 < γ < 1 is the relative weight that the household attaches to leisure.5
Every Ricardian household starts with an initial stock of physical capital ki0 = k0 > 0,
and has to decide how much to add to it in the form of new investment. The law of motion
for physical capital is
kit+1 = i
i
t + (1− δ)kit (2.2)
and 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate. Next, the real interest rate is rt, hence the before-tax
capital income of the household in period t equals rtk
i
t. In addition to capital income, the
Ricardian household can generate labor income. Hours supplied to the representative firm
are rewarded at the hourly wage rate of wt, so pre-tax labor income equals wth
i
t. Lastly, the
Ricardian households own the firm in the economy and has a legal claim on all the firm’s
profit, piit.
Next, the household’s problem can be now simplified to
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln cit + γ ln(1− hit)
}
(2.3)
s.t.
(1 + τ c)cit + k
i
t+1 − (1− δ)kit = (1− τ y)[rtkit + piit + wthit] + gtt (2.4)
where τ c is the tax on consumption, τ y is the proportional income tax rate (0 < τ c, τ y < 1),
and gtt denotes government transfers.
6 The Ricardian household takes the tax rates {τ c, τ y},
government spending categories, {gct , gtt}∞t=0, profit {pit}∞t=0, prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, and chooses
{cit, hit, kit+1}∞t=0 to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint.7
5This utility function is equivalent to a specification with a separable term containing government con-
sumption, e.g. Baxter and King (1993). Since in this paper we focus on the exogenous (observed) policies,
and the household takes government spending as given, the presence of such a term is irrelevant. For the
sake of brevity, we skip this term in the utility representation above.
6Note that government transfers are not type-dependent.
7Note that by choosing kit+1 the Ricardian household is implicitly setting investment i
i
t optimally.
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The first-order optimality conditions as as follows:
cit :
1
cit
= λt(1 + τ
c) (2.5)
hit :
γ
1− hit
= λt(1− τ y)wt (2.6)
kit+1 : λt = βEtλt+1
[
1 + [1− τ y]rt+1 − δ
]
(2.7)
TV C : lim
t→∞
βtλtk
i
t+1 = 0 (2.8)
where λt is the Lagrangean multiplier attached to household i’s budget constraint in period
t. The interpretation of the first-order conditions above is as follows: the first one states
that for each household, the marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal utility
of wealth, corrected for the consumption tax rate. The second equation states that when
choosing labor supply optimally, at the margin, each hour spent by the household working
for the firm should balance the benefit from doing so in terms of additional income generates,
and the cost measured in terms of lower utility of leisure. The third equation is the so-called
”Euler condition,” which describes how the household chooses to allocate physical capital
over time. The last condition is called the ”transversality condition” (TVC): it states that
at the end of the horizon, the value of physical capital should be zero.
2.1.2 Non-Ricardian Households
There is a unit measure of ”hand-to-mouth” (non-Ricardian) households, denoted by j, who
maximize the same expected utility function as the Ricardian agents:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln cjt + γ ln(1− hjt)
}
(2.9)
where E0 denotes household j’s expectations as of period 0, c
j
t denotes household j’s private
consumption in period t, hjt are hours worked in period t.
In contrast to the Ricardian households, non-Ricardian agents are not able to save or borrow,
due to some financial frictions such as liquidity constraints. The only source of income is
labor and the government transfers, so their budget constraint is
(1 + τ c)cjt = (1− τ y)wthjt + gtt (2.10)
6
Page 6 of 22Journal of Economics and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Econom
ics and Developm
ent
Note that the wage rate is the same for everyone, as labor services are assumed to be homo-
geneous. In addition, the dynamic optimization problem faced by non-Ricardian households
is degenerate, and collapses to a sequence of static problems, and choices are made in an
environment characterized by certainty.
In other words, non-Ricardians solve
max ln cjt + γ ln(1− hjt) (2.11)
s.t
(1 + τ c)cjt = (1− τ y)wthjt + gtt (2.12)
The Ricardian household takes the tax rates {τ c, τ y}, government transfers, {gtt}∞t=0, and
wages {wt}∞t=0, and chooses cjt , hjt ,∀t to maximize its period utility subject to the period
budget constraint.
The first-order optimality conditions are as follows:
cjt :
1
cjt
= λt(1 + τ
c) (2.13)
hjt :
γ
1− hjt
= λt(1− τ y)wt (2.14)
The interpretations are identical to the Ricardian case. Note that the shadow price of wealth
λt is the same for both types of households, as preferences are the same, and the marginal
rate of substitution is also the same.
2.2 Firm problem
There is a representative firm in the economy, which produces a homogeneous product. The
price of output is normalized to unity. The production technology is Cobb-Douglas and uses
both physical capital, kft , and labor hours, h
f
t , to maximize static profit
Πt = At(k
f
t )
α(hft )
1−α − rtkft − wthft , (2.15)
where At denotes the level of technology in period t. Since the firm rents the capital from
households, the problem of the firm is a sequence of static profit maximizing problems. In
7
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equilibrium, there are no profits, and each input is priced according to its marginal product,
i.e.:
kt : α
yt
kft
= rt, (2.16)
ht : (1− α) yt
hft
= wt. (2.17)
In equilibrium, given that the inputs of production are paid their marginal products, Πt =
piit = 0, ∀t.
2.3 Government
In the model setup, the government is levying taxes on labor and capital income, as well as
consumption, in order to finance spending on wasteful government purchases, and govern-
ment transfers. The government budget constraint is as follows:
gct + g
t
t = τ
c[ωcit + (1− ω)cjt ] + τ y[wthft + rtkft ] (2.18)
Income tax rate and government consumption-to-output ratio would be chosen to match
the average share in data, and consumption taxation is progressive. Finally, government
transfers would be determined residually in each period so that the government budget is
always balanced.
2.4 Market Clearing
In addition to the optimality conditions from the households’ and firm’s problem, as pre-
sented in the previous subsections, and the government budget constraint above, we need
to impose consistency among the different decisions. More specifically, this would require
that in equilibrium (i) aggregate quantities equal the sum of individual allocations, and (ii)
output, capital and labor markets all clear, or for all t:
ωct + (1− ω)cjt = Ct (2.19)
ωkit = k
f
t = Kt (2.20)
ωiit = It (2.21)
ωhit + (1− ω)hjt = hft = Ht. (2.22)
Ct + It + g
c
t = Yt, (2.23)
8
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where capital letters denote aggregate allocations.
2.5 Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
For a given process followed by technology {At}∞t=0 tax rates {τ c, τ y}, and initial capital stock
{ki0}, the decentralized dynamic competitive equilibrium is a list of aggregate allocations
{Ct, It, Kt, Ht, Yt}∞t=0 a list of sequences {cit, iit, kit, hit}∞t=0 for the Ricardian households, a list
of sequences {cjt , hjt}∞t=0 for the non-Ricardian households, a list of sequences {kft , hft }∞t=0
for the firm, a sequence of government purchases and transfers {gct , gtt}∞t=0, and input prices
{wt, rt}∞t=0 such that (i) the Ricardian and non-Ricardian households maximize their utility
function subject to their budget constraint; (ii) the representative firm maximizes profit; (iii)
government budget is balanced in each period; (iv) all markets clear.
3 Data and Model Calibration
To characterize business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria, we will focus on the period following
the introduction of the currency board (1999-2018). Quarterly data on output, consump-
tion and investment was collected from National Statistical Institute (2019), while the real
interest rate is taken from Bulgarian National Bank Statistical Database (2019). The cal-
ibration strategy described in this section follows a long-established tradition in modern
macroeconomics: first, as in Vasilev (2016), the discount factor, β = 0.982, is set to match
the steady-state capital-to-output ratio in Bulgaria, k/y = 13.964, in the steady-state Euler
equation. The labor share parameter, 1− α = 0.571, is obtain d as in Vasilev (2017d), and
equals the average value of labor income in aggregate output o er the period 1999-2016.
This value is slightly higher as compared to other studies on developed economies, due to
the overaccumulation of physical capital, which was part of the ideology of the totalitarian
regime, which was in place until 1989. Next, the average labor and capital income tax rate
was set to τ y = 0.1. This is the average effective tax rate on income between 1999-2007,
when Bulgaria used progressive income taxation, and equal to the proportional income tax
rate introduced as of 2008. Similarly, the average tax rate on consumption is set to its value
over the period, τ c = 0.2.
9
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Next, the relative weight attached to the utility out of leisure in the household’s utility
function, γ, is calibrated to match that in steady-state consumers would supply one-third of
their time endowment to working. This is in line with the estimates for Bulgaria (Vasilev
2017a) as well over the period studied. Next, the depreciation rate of physical capital in
Bulgaria, δ = 0.013, was taken from Vasilev (2016). It was estimated as the average quar-
terly depreciation rate over the period 1999-2014.
Parameter ω is a bit tricky to calibrate: Vasilev (2015c) shows that for the period right
after the banking and financial crisis in Bulgaria (1997-2005), which wiped most of the sav-
ings of the population, essentially everyone was liquidity constrained, or ω = 0. Since then,
however, the economy stabilized and started growing, so in our computational experiment,
we will set ω = 0.6, giving the Ricardian agents a small majority.8 Finally, the process
followed by TFP is estimated from the detrended series by running an AR(1) regression and
saving the residuals. Table 1 below summarizes the values of all model parameters used in
the paper.
Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description Method
β 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.429 Capital Share Data average
1− α 0.571 Labor Share Calibrated
γ 0.873 Relative weight attached to leisure Calibrated
δ 0.013 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data average
τ y 0.100 Average tax rate on income Data average
τ c 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data average
ω 0.600 Proportion of Ricardian households Set
ρa 0.701 AR(1) persistence coefficient, TFP process Estimated
σa 0.044 st. error, TFP process Estimated
8Coenen and Straub (2005) estimate 1 − ω = 0.24. Iwate (2009) uses ω = 0.7 arguing that the non-
Ricardian agents are the remaining ones, whch are subject to liquidity constraints. Gali et al. (2007) uses
ω = 0.5 as a benchmark.
10
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4 Steady-State
Once the values of model parameters were obtained, the steady-state equilibrium system
solved, the ”big ratios” can be compared to their averages in Bulgarian data. The results are
reported in Table 2 below. The steady-state level of output was normalized to unity (hence
the level of technology A differs from one, which is usually the normalization done in other
studies), which greatly simplified the computations. Next, the model matches consumption-
to-output and government purchases ratios by construction; The investment ratios are also
closely approximated, despite the closed-economy assumption and the absence of foreign
trade sector. The shares of income are also identical to those in data, which is an artifact
of the assumptions imposed on functional form of the aggregate production function. The
after-tax return, where r¯ = (1−τ y)r−δ is also relatively well-captured by the model. Lastly,
given the absence of debt, and the fact that transfers were chosen residually to balance the
government budget constraint, the result along this dimension is understandably not so close
to the average ratio in data.
Table 2: Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.648 0.674
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175
k/y Capital-to-output ratio 13.96 13.96
gc/y Government consumption-to-output ratio 0.151 0.151
wh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333
r¯ After-tax net return on capital 0.014 0.016
11
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5 Out of steady-state model dynamics
Since the model does not have an analytical solution for the equilibrium behavior of variables
outside their steady-state values, we need to solve the model numerically. This is done by
log-linearizing the original equilibrium (non-linear) system of equations around the steady-
state. This transformation produces a first-order system of stochastic difference equations.
First, we study the dynamic behavior of model variables to an isolated shock to the total
factor productivity process, and then we fully simulate the model to compare how the second
moments of the model perform when compared against their empirical counterparts.
5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
This subsection documents the impulse responses of model variables to a 1% surprise inno-
vation to technology. The impulse response functions (IRFs) are presented in Fig. 1 on the
next page. As a result of the one-time unexpected positive shock to total factor productivity,
output increases upon impact. This expands the availability of resources in the economy,
so used of output - consumption, investment, and government consumption also increase
contemporaneously.
At the same time, the increase in productivity increases the after-tax return on the two
factors of production, labor and capital. The households then respond to the incentives con-
tained in prices: the Ricardian households start accumulating capital, and supply more hours
worked, while non-Ricardian agents only increase their labor supply. In turn, the increase in
capital input feeds back in output through the production function and that further adds to
the positive effect of the technology shock. In the labor market, the wage rate increases, and
both types of households increase their hours worked. In turn, the increase in total hours
further increases output, again indirectly.
Over time, as capital is being accumulated, its after-tax marginal product starts to decrease,
which lowers the households’ incentives to save. As a result, physical capital stock eventually
returns to its steady-state, and exhibits a hump-shaped dynamics over its transition path.
The rest of the model variables return to their old steady-states in a monotone fashion as
12
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a 1% surprise innovation in technology
the effect of the one-time surprise innovation in technology dies out. Overall, at aggregate
level, the behavior of the economy is identical to that of the standard model, even though
only a fraction of households are allowed to save and invest.
5.2 Simulation and moment-matching
As in Vasilev (2017b), we will now simulate the model 10,000 times for the length of the data
horizon. Both empirical and model simulated data is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott
(1980) filter. Table 3 on the next page summarizes the second moments of data (relative
volatilities to output, and contemporaneous correlations with output) versus the same mo-
ments computed from the model-simulated data at quarterly frequency. The ”Model” is the
13
Page 13 of 22 Journal of Economics and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Econom
ics and Developm
ent
case with both Ricardian and non-Ricardian households, while the ”Benchmark RBC” is
the standard setup with Ricardian agents only. In addition, to minimize the sample error,
the simulated moments are averaged out over the computer-generated draws. As in Vasilev
(2016, 2017b, 2017c), both models match quite well the absolute volatility of output. By con-
struction, government consumption in both models varies as much as output. Furthermore,
both models are qualitatively consistent with the stylized fact that consumption generally
varies less than output, while investment is more volatile than output. However, the pre-
dicted consumption in the setup with non-Ricardian households is almost perfectly matched;
investment volatilies is lower and closer to that in data, as compared to the benchmark case.
Table 3: Business Cycle Moments
Data Model Benchmark RBC
σy 0.05 0.05 0.05
σc/σy 0.55 0.56 0.82
σi/σy 1.77 2.13 2.35
σg/σy 1.21 1.00 1.00
σh/σy 0.63 0.35 0.28
σw/σy 0.83 0.69 0.86
σy/h/σy 0.86 0.69 0.86
corr(c, y) 0.85 0.91 0.90
corr(i, y) 0.61 0.79 0.83
corr(g, y) 0.31 1.00 1.00
corr(h, y) 0.49 0.91 0.59
corr(w, y) -0.01 0.97 0.96
With respect to the labor market variables, the variability of employment predicted by both
models is lower than that in data, but a bit closer to data in the model with non-Ricardian
households. Next, the variability of wages in the standard model is very close to that in
data, and significantly lower in the model with non-Ricardian households. This is yet an-
other confirmation that the perfectly-competitive assumption for the wage rate, e.g. Vasilev
(2009), as well as the benchmark calibration here, does not describe very well the dynam-
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ics of labor market variables. Next, in terms of contemporaneous correlations, both model
systematically over-predicts the pro-cyclicality of the main aggregate variables - consump-
tion, investment, and government consumption. This, however, is a common limitation of
this class of models. Along the labor market dimension, the contemporaneous correlation
of employment with output in data is moderate, which is also what the standard model
generates, while the model with non-Ricardian predicts a much higher one.9 With respect
to wages, both model predict strong pro-cyclicality, while wages in data are acyclical. This
shortcoming is well-known in the literature and an artifact of the wage being equal to the
labor productivity in the model.
In the next subsection, as in Vasilev (2016), we investigate the dynamic correlation be-
tween labor market variables at different leads and lags, thus evaluating how well the model
matches the phase dynamics among variables. In addition, the autocorrelation functions
(ACFs) of empirical data, obtained from an unrestricted VAR(1) are put under scrutiny and
compared and contrasted to the simulated counterparts generated from the model.
5.3 Auto- and cross-correlation
This subsection discusses the auto-(ACFs) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs) of the
major model variables, presented in Table 4 below.10 For the sake of economizing space, we
present only the results for the model with non-Ricardian households.
As seen from Table 4 above, the model compares relatively well vis-a-vis data. Empirical
ACFs for output and investment are slightly outside the confidence band predicted by the
model, while the ACFs for total factor productivity and household consumption are well-
approximated by the model. The persistence of labor market variables are also relatively
well-described by the model dynamics. Overall, the model with non-Ricardian households
generates too much persistence in output and both employment and unemployment, and
is subject to the criticism in Nelson and Plosser (1992), Cogley and Nason (1995) and
9One way to address this limitation is to assume, as in Torres (2013), that non-Ricardian agents hold their
hours worked fixed, which would decrease the volatility of aggregate hours by the share of non-Ricardina
households in the population.
10Following Canova (2007), this is used as a goodness-of-fit measure.
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Table 4: Autocorrelations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Method Statistic 0 1 2 3
Data corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.765 0.552 0.553
Model corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.955 0.900 0.835
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.028) (0.054) (0.078)
Data corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.484 0.009 0.352
Model corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.955 0.900 0.835
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.028) (0.054) (0.078)
Data corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.810 0.663 0.479
Model corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.958 0.907 0.848
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.026) (0.050) (0.073)
Data corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.702 0.449 0.277
Model corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.956 0.902 0.840
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.027) (0.052) (0.077)
Data corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.971 0.952 0.913
Model corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.959 0.910 0.855
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.025) (0.048) (0.071)
Data corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.810 0.722 0.594
Model corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.953 0.895 0.826
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.029) (0.055) (0.080)
Data corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.760 0.783 0.554
Model corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.959 0.909 0.853
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.025) (0.048) (0.071)
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996b), who argue that the RBC class of models do not have a
strong internal propagation mechanism besides the strong persistence in the TFP process.
In those models, e.g. Vasilev (2009), and in the current one, labor market is modelled
in the Walrasian market-clearing spirit, and output and unemployment persistence is low.
Next, as seen from Table 5 below, over the business cycle, in data labor productivity leads
employment. The model, however, cannot account for this fact. As in the standard RBC
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model a technology shock can be regarded as a factor shifting the labor demand curve, while
holding the labor supply curve constant. Therefore, the effect between employment and
labor productivity is only a contemporaneous one, despite the presence of non-Ricardina
agents in the economy.
Table 5: Dynamic correlations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Method Statistic -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Data corr(ht, (y/h)t−k) -0.342 -0.363 -0.187 -0.144 0.475 0.470 0.346
Model corr(ht, (y/h)t−k) 0.030 0.043 0.061 0.799 0.200 0.124 0.070
(s.e.) (0.326) (0.283) (0.233) (0.122) (0.228) (0.269) (0.308)
Data corr(ht, wt−k) 0.355 0.452 0.447 0.328 -0.040 -0.390 -0.57
Model corr(ht, wt−k) 0.030 0.043 0.061 0.799 0.200 0.124 0.070
(s.e.) (0.326) (0.283) (0.233) (0.122) (0.228) (0.269) (0.308)
6 Conclusions
We introduce non-Ricardian (”hand-to-mouth”) myopic agents into an otherwise standard
real-business-cycle setup augmented with a detailed government sector. We calibrate the
model to Bulgarian data for the period following the introduction of the currency board
arrangement (1999-2018). We investigate the quantitative importance of the presence of
non-optimizing households for cyclical fluctuations in Bulgaria. We find that the inclusion
of such non-optimizing households improves model performance along several dimensions and
provide a better match vis-a-vis data, as compared to the standard model with Ricardian
agents only. Therefore, capital markets imperfections, or restricted access to credit for
some of the households in the population may have important repercussions for fiscal policy
issues and income inequality, and thus the inclusion of non-Ricardian agents is a must when
investigating such questions in general-equilibrium setups.
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